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I. INTRODUCTION
When originally enacted, the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 19342 were designed to provide investors protection from
fraudulent activities and to promote ethical standards of honest and fair
dealing.3 Driven by this philosophy, the courts fashioned an implied private
cause of action for violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5,4 which was to provide a means of
lSecurities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-bbbb (1988)) [hereinafter 1933 Act].
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ll (1988)) [hereinafter 1934 Act].
3 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (describing the purposes
behind the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
4Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
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furthering the deterrence rationale of the Securities Acts and, more importantly,
to create a means of compensation for those investors who had been
defrauded.5
Under the current system, defendants found liable for a 10b-5 violation are
jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the judgment. 6 Therefore, a
defendant who did not know of the fraud but was reckless in her failure to
discover its existence may be held liable for the full amount of the judgment,
regardless of how minimally her conduct contributed to the alleged wrong.7
The classic rationale for joint and several liability is that as against innocent
investors and marginally culpable defendants, it is more important to make the
investors whole than limit a "guilty" defendant's exposure to proportionate
liability.
However, in 1994, this rationale may involve such tremendous risks to the
economic environment that the total cost outweighs forcing defendants, who
often times are not the actual perpetrators of the fraud, to pay the entire
damages of the investors. For example, joint and several liability fuels intense
pressure to bring and settle unmeritorious suits.8 Also, meritorious suits
against marginally culpable defendants may settle at too high a price due to
the ominous risk of exposure to full liability.9 Furthermore, so called "risky"
clients are no longer given easy access to capital markets. The risk of liability
concomitant with such clients outweighs the compensation gained from
providing them the legal or accounting services necessary for capital
formation.10
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) [hereinafter cited as Rule 10b-51.
5See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,730 (1975); Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,150 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971); see also Tomar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 555 (1981).
6 See generally, Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1049 (3d ed.
1995).
7Id.
8 See generally Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlement in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
9 1d.
10 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation ofAccounting: Some Economic Issues, 52 BROOK.
L. REV. 1051, 1054-55 (1987).
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In response to this dilemma, new legislation entitled the Securities Private
Enforcement Reform Act 11 has been introduced in Congress. At the heart of
this legislation is tailoring the liability of defendants to the degree of their
culpability through the introduction of proportionate liability into 10b-5
litigation. For this legislation to be viable it seems dear that the risks mentioned
above must provide adequate justification for allowing "guilty" defendants to
pay only a proportionate share of the damages based on their degree of fault
at the expense of investors possibly being made less than whole.
The purpose of this note is to evaluate the ramifications of this particular
proposed amendment to the 1934 Act. Part II will summarize the current status
of the proposed bill and its provisions. Part I will briefly survey the history
and requirements of the private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, particularly
the scienter requirement because of its impact on the understanding of the
proposed reform. Finally, Part l will address the justifications for the proposed
reform, and the effects the reform will have on 10b-5 litigation.
II. STATUS AND SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The proposed Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act was introduced
during the 102nd Congress and would apply to implied private actions brought
under 10(b)12 of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. On August 11, 1992, the Bill was
introduced in the House13 by Democratic Representative William J. Tauzin and
in the Senate1 4 by Republican Senator Pete V. Domenici on August 12, 1992.
During the 102nd Congress both bills were submitted to committee and were
not reported on before the end of the term. On January 5,1993, during the 103rd
session of Congress, the House Bill 15 was re-introduced by Representative
Tauzin and submitted to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, where
it remains pending.16 The last action taken on the House Bill was March 24,
1994. The Senate Bill has yet to be re-introduced.
11HR. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
12Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or any facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) [hereinafter cited as section 10(b)].
13H.R. 5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
14S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
15 H.R. 417, supra note 11.
16139 CONG. REC. H 111 (daily ed. Jan. 6,1993).
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The proposed legislation expressly states that "[e]xcessive securities
litigation is a serious burden on the national economy",17 and "[t]he meritless
lawsuits filed under Federal Securities laws are making it harder for American
companies to raise capital and attract experienced members to serve on their
boards."18 In order to reform the securities laws and alleviate the problem of
"strike suits" (suits brought for their settlement value alone) the House Bill
proposes a number of different measures. The House Bill would create a
two-tiered liability system for Rule 10b-5 securities cases, recognizing that less
culpable defendants should be treated differently than those who intentionally
commit securities violations. The House Bill would impose joint and several
liability for 10b-5 violations only on defendants who engage in "knowing
securities fraud",19 which is defined as the "making of a false statement with
actual knowledge of its falsity or omitting to make a statement with the actual
knowledge that as a result of the omission, material representations made are
false."20 Reckless conduct would not be sufficient to establish a "knowing"
violation.21 However, reckless behavior is not exonerated from liability; rather,
defendants who are reckless will be liable solely for the portion of the damages
for which a jury finds them responsible.22 Therefore, "less" culpable defendants
would not be required to compensate the plaintiff for damages attributable to
the actions of other parties. This provision of the legislation would relate only
to the allocation of damages; it expressly would not affect the standards for
determining liability for implied private actions under lOb-5. 23
In order to provide a disincentive to plaintiffs bringing securities actions
merely for their settlement value, the House Bill incorporates an attorney's fee
shifting provision.24 Under this provision, a losing party or his attorney may
be required to pay the attorney's fees incurred by the winning party under
certain circumstances. The House Bill does not mandate automatic fee shifting,
but requires the loser to pay the winner's fees only if two conditions are
17H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 2(1).
181d. § 2(2).
19 d. § 20B(1).
201d. § 20B(3)(A).
21id. § 20B(3)(B).
22H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 3(a)(2)(A)-(B). Under the statutory scheme the trier of fact
will determine the percentage of responsibility of not only the named individual and
entity defendants, but the plaintiff's degree of responsibility as well. In making this
determination the jury is to consider the nature of each person's conduct and the causal
relationship between this conduct and the alleged harm. After these percentages have
been found, a defendant's contribution to the plaintiff's damages is to be calculated by
multiplying his percentage by the total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
No defendant whose liability is determined under this proportionate scheme is to be
held jointly liable on any judgment entered against another party.
23 d. § 3(a)(2)(A)(4); see also infra text accompanying notes 42-69.
24 H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 3(a)(4)(B).
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satisfied. First, if the losing party establishes that its position was substantially
justified, it is not required to pay the winner's fees.25 Second, fees may be
awarded only if the losing party was put on notice that he might have to pay
attorney's fees, and a judicial determination had already been made that the
case was not substantially justified. 26 If the court issues such a finding and
grants the fee shifting motion, the prevailing party is eligible to recover any
fees incurred in the litigation from that point forward.
Furthermore, the legislation expressly would eliminate four abusive
practices found to be associated with the filing of 10b-5 actions. First, in class
actions, representative plaintiffs would no longer be permitted to obtain a
recovery greater than that of the other plaintiffs in the class unless the
additional sum is justified as compensation for costs actually incurred.27
Second, an attorney could not represent a class when he is a beneficial owner
of the securities that are the subject of the litigation.28 Third, securities brokers
and dealers could not receive "steering fees"29 for referring customers to an
attorney.30 Fourth, funds disgorged as the result of an SEC enforcement
proceeding would have to be paid to victims of fraud and could not be used to
compensate private attorneys.31
The proposed legislation would also extend the current statute of limitations
in securities actions, which requires securities fraud lawsuits to be brought
within one year after the date on which the violation was discovered but not
later than three years after the date on which the violation occurred. 32 The
House Bill would require the lawsuit to be brought within one year after the




271d. § 3(c)(1). This provision is aimed at the elimination of "professional plaintiffs"
from 10b-5 actions. Plaintiffs, who have very little at stake in the lawsuit, act as the
representative in class actions merely to recover the extra compensation allotted to the
representative of the class. Under the new scheme, the representive's share of the final
judgment will be calculated in the same manner as all other members of the class.
28Id. § 3(c)(2)(A).
29 H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 3(c)(2)(B). Steering fees are payments made to third
parties who assist plaintiff's attorneys obtain representation of a party in an action.-
301d.
3 1 id.
32 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782
(1991). The Court in Lampfeliminated the long standing practice of choosing relatively
liberal state statutes of limitation for lOb-5 actions and substituted the uniform federal
rule. Id.
33 H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 4.
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As a further curb on abusive practices, the House Bill contains a number of
additional proposed reforms not found in the Senate Bill, proposed during the
102nd Congress. First, plaintiffs, in order to satisfy their burden of proof of
fraud, would be required to prove allegations of fraud by clear and convincing
evidence, as opposed to the current preponderance of the evidence standard
of proof.34 Also, plaintiffs, in pleading the scienter requirement,35 would be
required to allege specific facts in their complaint indicating that the defendant
acted with scienter or an intent to defraud.36 Finally, secondary actors, such as
accountants, lawyers, or underwriters would not be liable for aiding and
abetting another defendant's violation of the securities laws unless the plaintiff
could prove that the secondary actor acted "with deliberate intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud for the defendant's own direct pecuniary benefit".37
III. BRIEF SURVEY OF THE 10b-5 IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
To fully analyze the impact of the introduced House Bill on 10b-5 actions,
the judicial requirements and origins of the 10b-5 private right of action must
be considered. The dominant private remedies for securities fraud are provided
by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. 38
Although well established today, an implied right of action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 was not initially recognized; in fact, a private right of action had
to be judicially implied because section 10(b) does not expressly authorize
private actions.39 However, relying on tort principles, the court in Kardon v.
341d. § 3(d).
3 5 See infra text accompanying notes 42-50.
3 6H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 3(e). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that
"the circumstances constituting fraud.., be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally." Despite
this approach to pleading the state of mind of the defendant, courts have reached
different conclusions on the pleading requirement under section 10b-5. Compare Ross v.
A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545,558 (2d Cir. 1979) with Auslender v. Energy Management
Corp., 832 F.2d 354,357 (6th Cir. 1987). The legislation will end the dispute by requiring
that plaintiffs plead the "scienter" component of lob-S actions with specific facts. Many
commentators feel that a strict requirement for pleading "scienter" runs afoul to the
notice pleading standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kevin R.Johnson,
Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667, 676 n.30 (1991); Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 433,
477 (1986). But see Note, Using Rule 9(b) to Reduce Nuisance Securities Litigation, 99 YALE
L. J. 1591,1601 (1990).
3 7H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 3.
38 See generally John A. Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities
Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783 (1980) (surveying the
development of private actions under the securities laws).
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National Gypsum Co.40 implied a private action for violations of Rule lOb-5.
Twenty five years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the existence of a private
right of action under Section 10(b) in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v.
Bankers Life & Casualty C0.41
Having created this private right of action, without the guidance of a
legislative framework, the courts necessarily obligated themselves to the
development of a federal common law. Although acting amidst a certain degree
of doctrinal uncertainty due to the lack of legislative action, the courts have
mandated several elements of a 10b-5 private cause of action; the most
important of these elements for purposes of this discussion is the scienter
requirement 42 In Ernst & Ernst v. HochfelderA the Supreme Court held that a
4069 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In justifying the creation of an implied right of
action, the court reasoned that securities legislation was created primarily to protect the
interest of the individual investors and stated,
the violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or
by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion
of an interest of another if; (a) the interest of the enactment is exclusively
or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect.
Id. at 513 (quoting the Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934)).
41404 U.S. 6,13 n.9 (1971).
4 2In addition to scienter, under Rule lOb-5 a private plaintiff must plead and prove
the following elements:
(1) Purchaser/Seller. The plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,754-55 (1975).
(2) Materiality. The fact omitted or misrepresented must have been material. A
fact is material "if there is a substancial likelihood that a reasonable...[investor] would
consider it important." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see
also Santa FeIndus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,474 (1977); Madison Consultants v. FDIC,
710 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1983); Simpson v. Southeastern Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257, 1259
(5th Cir. 1983); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168,176 (8th Cir. 1982).
(3) 'In Connection With." The fraud must have occurred "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security. See supra note 12 (text of Section 10(b)); supra note 4 (text
of Rule 10b-5); see also Superintendendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6,10 (1971) (addressing scope of "in connection with" requirement).
(4) Reliance. Generally, a plaintiff must have relied on the fact that was omitted
or misrepresented. Where the fact was omitted, plaintiffs reliance is presumed.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,153 (1972); see also Huddleston v.
Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 459
U.S. 375 (1983); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
(5) Causation. The injury to the plaintiff must result from the omission or
misrepresentation. See Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57,
61 (2d Cir. 1985); Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040,1048 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 US. 925
(1978).
(6) Jurisdictional Means. The defendant must have used interstate commerce, the
mails, or a facility of a national securities exchange in committing the violation. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 148 (affirming district court's holding that the
defendants in the case had made use of the required jurisdictional means).
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private cause of action for damages will not lie under Rule 10b-5 in the absence
of any allegation of scienter. The Court defined scienter as "[a] mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."44 However, the Court
failed to precisely define the boundaries of the scienter requirement and
expressly left open the question whether "[i]n some circumstances, reckless
behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."45 In
two subsequent decisions, the Court merely repeated its application and
definition of the scienter requirement and did not expand on its applicability to
reckless conduct.46
In light of the Supreme Court's failure to address the recklessness standard
the onus was left on the lower federal judiciary to do so. The lower courts,
notwithstanding Hochfelder's emphasis on intentional conduct in the
formulation of the scienter requirement, concluded that recklessness satisfied
the scienter requirement for 10b-5 liability.47 Due to lack of guidance, the body
of law created by the lower federal courts, in many instances, seems to lack any
form of precision or predictability, and, as a result, recklessness determinations
have become nearly ad hoc and arbitrary. 48 One judge may deem an accused
party to have acted recklessly, while a different judge in another case may
43425 U.S. 185 (1976).
4 41d. at 194 n.3.
4 51d. The Supreme Court again failed to decide the issue in Herman & Maclean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.42 (1983). Despite continued ambiguity regarding the
content of the Court's scienter requirement, the Hochfelder opinion clearly exluded a
negligence standard from the lob-5 culpability spectrum. Because the Court
side-stepped the question of whether recklessness was a culpable mental state under
lob-5 and other questions, Hochfelder has been described as "puzzling" and "leaving as
many questions as it answers." Loss, supra note 6. However, given the Court's heavy
emphasis on intentional conduct in its definition of scienter, a recklessness standard for
liability seems beyond the intentions of the Court; many scholars agree. See generally,
Johnson, supra note 36; James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and
Evaluation of its Impact upon the Scheme of Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569,
628(1977).
4 6 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) (quoting Hochfelder's definition of
scienter); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (reiterating Hochfelder's narrow
definition of scienter and holding that scienter was necessary to establish entitlement to
injunctive relief in SEC enforcement actions brought under section 10(b)).
4 7 See Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter., 873 F.2d 1094,1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Woods v. Barnett
Bank, 765 F.2d 1004,1010 (11th Cir. 1985); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114,1117 (10th
Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,193 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017,1024 (6th
Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serqold, 576 F.2d 1332,1337 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1044 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
48 See infra text accompanying notes 51-59.
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exonerate a defendant charged with nearly identical misconduct.49 As will be
shown it is this imprecision that is a primary culprit of many of the abusive
practices and results in 10b-5 litigation. The proposed legislation does not
propose to eliminate the recklessness standard 5 0 however, a further
investigation into this spectrum of liability is essential to understanding the
problems facing Rule 10b-5 defendants.
The lower courts' attempts at determining when conduct satisfies the
reckless scienter standard for 10b-5 liability can best be described as creating a
spectrum of culpability.51 At one end of the spectrum the courts require a
showingof"severe recklessness." In G.A. Thompson &Co. v. Partridge,52 the court
found a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truthfulness of the
circumstances as central to their definition of severe recklessness. 53 In light of
the Hochfielder Court's emphasis on intentional conduct, the court reasoned that
only when a defendant acts consciously should 10b-5 liability be extended.
54
However, as is true for other tests, the severe recklessness rubric may serve as
no more than a convenient label than as a true analytical device.55
49 For example, in McDonald v. Alan Fush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809,810 (11 th Cir.
1989), the court held that an investment broker was entitled to a directed verdict on a
10b-5 claim when he recklessly provided poor advice. On the other hand, the court in
Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1984),
held that an investor was entitled to have a jury hear his claim when an investor had
provided investment advise which he should have known was poor. Compare Pegasus
Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335,1340 (9th Cir. 1980) (which held thatan accounting
firm was entitled to summary judgment on a claim that the firm recklessly failed to
follow auditing standards) with Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301,
1306-07 (9th Cir. 1982) (where the court denied summary judgment given facts almost
identical to those in Pegasus).
50 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
5lSee Johnson, supra note 36. In an attempt to provide predictability to the
recklessness determination, the article suggests that when an actor did not stand in a
position to gain a direct profit from the fraud that a fact-finder should presume that the
defendantdid notact recklessly. SeeRiedel v. Acutote of Colo., 773 F. Supp. 1055,1065-66
(S.D. Ohio) (considering whether the defendant knew of the misleading or omitted
material and stood to receive pecuniary gain in evaluating scienter based on
recklessness), appeal dismissed, 947 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Woods v. Bamett
Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985); Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741,
746 (5th Cir. 1984); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929,961 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
52636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981).
531d. at 961.
541d. at 960-61.
55 See Marc I. Steinberg & Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" after
Hochfelder &Aaron, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 179,200-03 (1980) (arguing that the lack of uniformity
in the application of the "severe recklessness" test indicates that the courts have defined
their own notions of severe recklessness based upon personal notions of equity).
1994]
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At the opposite end of the spectrum is a level of culpability that has been
termed the 'barely reckless" standard. In Stern v. American Bankshares Corp.,56
the court held that the corporate officers and directors were reckless if they
knew or should have known of the facts and circumstances concerning the
fraud.5 7 The "barely reckless" standard seems inconsistent with the Hochfelder's
emphasis on intentional conduct and is dangerously close to a simple
negligence standard which was held to be insufficient in the formulation of the
scienter requirement.58 It epitomizes the significant variation in the standards
for recklessness under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The most common definition of recklessness for purposes of 10b-5 claims is
the one presented by the court in Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.59 In
Sundstrand, the court, emphasizing that reckless conduct had objective as well
as subjective components, defined recklessness as an "[e]xtreme departure
from standards of ordinary care... which presents a danger... either known
to the defendant or... so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it."60
Again, some of the language used by the Sundstrand court resembles a simple
test for negligence. For this reason, although popular, Sundstrand has been
criticized specifically because the line between an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care (recklessness under Sundstrand) and a simple
departure from these standards (negligence) cannot be easily drawn.61
The recklessness standard for 10b-5 culpability arguably does further the
intentions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act Injured investors, under this
standard, do not bear the heightened burden of proving that defendants acted
with intent. However, the fact-intensive and many times ad hoc nature of
determining when a defendant has acted recklessly in a 10b-5 action means
that minimally culpable defendants may face crushing liability and is a major
incentive to the very strike suits which the proposed legislation seeks to abate.
The result of this ad hoc methodology is that actual and potential parties to a
Rule 10b-5 action cannot predict with any degree of certainty how a trier of fact
56429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
5 71d. at 826.
58 See supra note 45.
59553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
601d. at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725(W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d
1564, 1569 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (the rational of the court was that it will bring
greater uniformity to the law of the various circuits), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991);
In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Hackbart v.
Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d
175,193-94 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
61 See Johnson, supra note 36; Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud under Section 10(b) and
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will characterize challenged conduct and, thus, whether it may serve as the
basis for liability.62
Utilizing the recklessness standard for culpability under 10b-5 actions,
plaintiffs can cast a much wider net to draw upon deep pocket professionals,
such as accounting firms, lawyers and investment bankers, who have given
advice on the transactions which led to the allegedly fraudulent occurrence.63
This wide net is essential for plaintiffs because, often when securities fraud is
discovered, the primary offender is insolvent.64
Recognizing this problem and seeking to enhance relief for securities fraud,
the lower federal courts created a cause of action for aiding and abetting
securities fraud violations.6 5 Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Central
62 See Johnson, supra note 36.
63 Defendants formerly sued solely as alleged aiders and abettors made ideal "deep
pockets" because, if found liable they were jointly and severally liable with the primary
violator. The classic illustration of the "wide-net" of liability is Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139, 153 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1970), in which the plaintiffs sued not
only the president of the bank, who had stolen money to speculate on the stock market,
but also the New York Stock Exchange, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, another bank, the bank's outside accountants,
12 brokerage firms that executed stock transactions for thepresident, and 16 individuals
associa ted with those firms. See generally John T. Vangel, A Complicity-Doctrine Approach
to Section 10(b) Aiding and Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 180 (1989)
(Where the mental state line is drawn on the intent-recklessness spectrum directly
determines the probability of remote-party liability. Due to the relative ease of proving
a reckless state of mind [simply point out a defendant's failure to meet regulatory
standards or professional guidelines], a recklesness standard dramatically increases the
probability of remote-party liability which seems to decrease a defendant's willingness
to go to trial); David Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597,
599 (1972) (noting the ingenuity of the plaintiffs joining "secondary defendants"); Harris
J. Amhowitz, The Accounting Profession & The Law: The Misunderstood Victim, J. ACCT.,
May 1987, at 356, 359.
6 4For example, in Edwards & Nahly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d
478, 481 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1984), the primary 10b-5 violator, the
broker who sold the securities, was insolvent due to fraudulent short sales concealed
from a bank. Due to this insolvency the plaintiff could only recover if it could locate a
solvent party who took part in the transactions; a clearance corporation was joined. See
also Don J. McDermett, Jr., Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10(b):
The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1087,1104 (1991); Ruder,
supra note 63.
6 5 0ne of the earliest reported securities cases dealing with aider and abettor liability
analogized the cause of action to the field of criminal aiding and abetting, especially to
fraud. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 37 (N.D. Cal. 1939), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944). The seminal case in the development of the 10b-5
aiding and abetting doctrine is Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 259
F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970). Brennan, is considerd to be a landmark case for two reasons. First, the Brennan
court held that lob-5 liability can be imposed on a defendant who was not a primary
participant in the fraudulent activity. Id. at 680-81. Second, the court expressly based
aiding and abetting liability on section 876(b) of the Restatement Second of Torts, which
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Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 66 held that a private
plaintiff may not maintain a suit for aiding and abetting under section 10(b).
The Court in Central Bank relied upon the text of section 10(b) to conclude that
the implied private right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors.67 In
so holding the Court avoided deciding the difficult issue of whether proof of
reckless conduct was sufficient to establish aiding and abetting liability. As with
the scienter requirement necessary in the primary violation context of 10b-5
actions,68 the appropriate standard to effectuate the "knowledge" requirement
of aiding and abetting liability was equally expansive and dependent upon the
facts of each case and, as a result, equally unpredictable. 69
An implied private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 has its origins in
common law tort liability.70 As a result, all defendants found liable, whether as
a primary violator with the scienter requirement as defined in the Hochfelder
case or a remote participant who has merely been reckless, will be held jointly
and severally liable for the complete judgment obtained by the plaintiff.71 The
sheer magnitude of joint and several liability weighs heavy on the minds of
innocent, as well as "guilty", defendants as they make the choice between
settlement and trial.72 Also, joint and several liability encourages plaintiffs to
more readily name secondary actors as defendants and to bring strike suits that,
states that one will be liable for the torts of another if he has knowledge of the act and
gives substantial assistance to the tortfeasor. Id. at 680; see also Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock,
Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57,62 (2d Cir. 1985); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,
624 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38,45 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139,162 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
66114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
671d. at 1446.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 42-50.
69 The knowledge or recklessness element of aider and abettor liability overlaps and
many times is equated with the scienter requirement of lOb-5 liability. See, e.g., W.O.
Akin v. Q-1 Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1992); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779,784 (8th Cir. 1981).
7OKardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
71Under general principles of tort law, when two or more defendants' joint acts
combine to form a single, indivisible injury, they are jointly and severably liable. See W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971); see, e.g., W.O. Akcin, 959 F.2d at 530; Molecular
Technology Corp. v. Al Valentine, 925 F.2d 910,917 (6th Cir. 1991); Hoxworth v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 202 (3rd Cir. 1990); In re Warner Communications
Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2nd Cir. 1986); Arioli v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 792 F.
Supp. 1050,1061 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324,1328 (E.D. Cal.
1987); First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1029,1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Harrison v. Sheats, 608 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
72 See generally Alexander, supra note 8; Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivilous Lawsuits on
the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 18 (1991).
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if actually tried, would have little success at trial. 73 By fairly apportioning
damages among defendants based upon the character of their culpability, the
proposed legislation seeks to address these problems in 10b-5 litigation.
IV. CRmCAL EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED REFORM
As stated in Part I, the justification for the imposition of proportionate
liability into 10b-5 litigation must be that the risks associated with joint and
several liability outweigh imposing full liability upon defendants who are only
marginally culpable in the perpetration of the fraud in order to compensate
investors for their total loss. The remainder of this discussion focuses on the
risks associated with joint and several liability, and the answers provided by
imposing liability proportionately with the degree of fault.
A. Risks of Unmeritorious Settlement and Settlement of Unmeritorious Suits
When the courts began creating and shaping the private implied right of
action under Rule 10b-5, their intentions were to further the goals of the 1934
Act, which are aimed at the protection of investors. Specifically, the implied
right was to create for investors a means of compensation if they had been
defrauded or wronged. However, Rule 10b-5 litigation has turned into nearly
a "faultless" system. Due to the circumstances surrounding Rule 10b-5
litigation, such as the unpredictable nature of liability under Rule 10b-5, the
risk of being held jointly and severally liable for huge amounts of damages in
class actions by shareholders, and the high costs in defending such securities
actions, defendants, guilty or not, have no choice but to favor settlement over
trial.74 The Central Bank Court recognized this dilemma and responded by
eliminating liability for aiding and abetting. In that case the Court stated:
Because of the uncertainty of the governing rules, entities subject to
secondary liability as aiders and abettors may find it prudent and
necessary, as a business judgment, to abandon substantial defenses
and to pay settlements in order to avoid the expenses and risk of going
to trial.75
Consequently, comparatively less culpable defendants settle for a
disproportionate share of the damages in order to avoid trial.76 In other words,
innocent or marginally culpable defendants are weighing the options and
foregoing the opportunity to present their meritorious defenses at trial.
73 Seegenerally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extracta Settlement Offer, 17J. LEGAL
STUD. 437 (1988); David Rosenberg & Steven A. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits are
Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3 (1985).
74 See Alexander, supra note 8.
75114 S. Ct. at 1454.
76Id.
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Generally, settlement is the preferred method of dispute resolution by the
courts, not only because it alleviates a heavy case load burden from court
dockets, but more importantly because it allows parties to reach a fair
agreement concerning their dispute.77 In balanced situations parties make
decisions about settlement based on rational estimates of the expected
economic value of the case after litigation, including the costs of that
litigation. 78 This is commonly referred to as the economic model for settlement
negotiation. 79 The weakness of this model in 10b-5 litigation is that it makes
the assumption that the parties are primarily considering the merits of the
lawsuit in determining whether to accept or reject a settlement.80 Settlement is
only a valuable tool in the administration of justice when the merits of the case
are considered, for the intended goal is to reflect the discounted value of an
actual trial outcome even though there is no adjudication of the facts in the
case.81
In 10b-5 actions the strength of the cause of action on the merits has become
largely irrelevant to the settlement process. 82 First, alleged 10b-5 violators are
placed into a position of choosing between settlement and trial because it is
extremely unlikely that they will be able to dispose of the case by motion. The
materiality and scienter requirements previously discussed are highly fact
specific, and many courts hold that it is inappropriate to settle such elements
by summary judgment.83 Second, the extremely high costs and stakes of
securities litigation puts an inordinate amount of pressure on the defendant's
decision to settle. For example, it is relatively inexpensive for a plaintiff's firm
to file a boilerplate complaint with requests for discovery in comparison with
77 See generally William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON.
61(1971).
78 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717,734 (1986) ("Most defendants are unlikely to settle
unless the cost of the predicated judgment, discounted by its probability, plus the
transactional costs of further litigation are greater than the cost of the settlement
package.").
79 See Alexander, supra note 8.
801d.
81See Landes, supra note 77.
82 See Alexander, supra note 8. The hypothesis of the article was to prove that the
expected value after trial is not the primary determinant of settlement in 10b-5 cases. By
selecting a group of cases presumably similar in all respects except for the merits and
noticing that the outcomes in each of these cases were similar, the author concludes that
there is a negation of the conventional theory that outcomes are a function of expected
value and of the merits. One of the most striking uniformities in the examined cases was
the finding that every case settled for exactly twenty-five percent of the claimed
damages, an amount the author claims is the minimum that would justify the filing of
the lawsuit for plaintiff's attorneys.
83 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
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the cost a defendant incurs in having to fulfill such discovery requests.84 Finally,
the enormous burden of being exposed to joint and several liability for the full
amount of a judgment and the risk created by the unpredictable nature of 10b-5
litigation combine to form the greatest deterrent effect to trial for a defendant.
As a result of these circumstances, the merits of the case are often a negligible
factor in the settlement calculus, because defendants, innocent or marginally
culpable, are not willing to take the risk of crushing liability when it is far
cheaper to settle.85 When adjudication is too great a risk, the merits of the case
and the innocence of the defendant recede in significance, and instead
settlement negotiations are based primarily on non-merit related factors such
as the financial condition of the defendant, the amount of professional liability
insurance the defendant carries, and the lawyer's bargaining tactics.86
Expressly stated, the main goal of the proposed legislation is to reform the
present system of 10b-5 litigation by ensuring that fewer frivolous (meritless)
securities fraud suits are filed in federal courts for the primary purpose of
coercing nuisance settlements from innocent defendants. 87 The Bill
accomplishes this goal by imposing joint and several liability upon only those
defendants who engage in "knowing" securities fraud88 and limiting the
exposure of those defendants who act with recklessness to proportional
liability, or in other words, liability only for their share of the damages award
as determined by a jury. By removing the risk that a defendant will be held
jointly and severally liable even if found only to have acted recklessly,
defendants included merely because of their marginal involvement and deep
pockets will now have an incentive to take a case to trial; if they feel the case
has no merit or that the merits are weak, they will be more willing to risk an
adverse judgment based on recklessness knowing their exposure will be in
accordance with the degree of their culpability. Conversely, if they settle, the
settlement amount agreed upon will more closely reflect the lesser degree of
the defendant's culpability. Therefore, a link is established between the merits
and the settlement process by increasing the willingness of defendants to take
cases to trial. Under these new circumstances, the economic model for
settlements becomes effective because, with a realistic expectation of
adjudication on the merits, expected trial outcomes must be considered. 89
84 In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
affd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
8 5 SeeJohn C. CoffeJr., Is Innocence Irrelevant? Under RICO, Trial Has become Secondary,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 13,1989, at 20 (If defendants can not risk trial, the meritorious factual
defenses become irrelevant.).
86 See Alexander, supra note 8.
87H.R. 417, supra note 11, § 2(4).
88 See supra text accompanying note 20.
89 See Landes, supra note 77.
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The consequence of allowing "deep pocket" defendants to pay only their
proportionate share of damages may be enormous in the eyes of innocent
investors, for without these defendants' money investors may not fully recover
their loss. Frequently the most culpable potential defendants are budding
enterprises whose earnings were less than expected, and they have not
amassed assets sufficient to satisfy a potentially adverse verdict.90 In light of
this fact, secondary participants with "deep pockets" become the focus of the
lawsuit. The balance to be struck by Congress is the innocent investors versus
the marginally culpable defendant. Behind the argument of the investors may
be justice but behind the argument for the marginally culpable deep pockets is
macroeconomics.
B. Risk of Shrinking Capital Markets for "Risky" Start-up Ventures
The concerns regarding the onus of joint and several liability become more
acute for market participants such as accounting and law firms. Assuming,
arguendo, that these entities are generally less culpable due to their limited
participation in the allegedly fraudulent transaction, the chance that these less
culpable actors' potential liability far exceeds their degree of culpability, and
more importantly their pre-determined fees, has a significant impact on the
costs and availability of the services that are provided.
Of course, if defendants are found to be knowingly or recklessly liable then
there is "guilt" under Rule 10b-5. However, when actors are not found to be
purposely fraudulent, there are serious economic downsides to penalizing
marginal participation in the allegedly fraudulent activity with full Rule 10b-5
liability. This is of special concern because knowing participants usually are the
perpetrators of the fraudulent scheme, and the reckless participants are sued
solely for failing to stop or discover the fraud.
Comparative negligence statutes have flourished in tort law, and as has been
indicated, a union of tort concepts with Rule 10b-5 would not be inconsistent.91
The philosophy of these statutes is that negligent parties are only held
responsible for their own conduct. The proposed legislation adopts the spirit
of the comparative negligence doctrine by proportionately allocating damages
among proportionately culpable defendants. As stated, in establishing
culpability under Rule 10b-5, the line between recklessness and negligence is
often times blurred. In many instances this benefits investors by allowing
recovery. However, this same fluidity in culpable mental states that benefits
investors provides extra support for the proposed legislation's adoption of
comparative negligence philosophy. In this manner the Bill protects marginally
culpable accounting and law firms from full liability when their only "mistake"
was a failure to stop the fraud.
90 See W. John Moore, Litigators Replace Capitalists as Kings of Silicon Valley, LEGAL
TIMES, July 2,1984, at 1; see generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073(1984).
91 See supra text accompanying note 70.
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This protection seems justified when the only benefit received by way of the
accounting, investment or law firms limited participation is a pre-determined
fee which rarely covers the large damages sought in Rule 10b-5 actions, and as
a result these firms must raise their prices for services beyond the reach of the
budding enterprises who need them. Accountants and investment banking
firms are essential in opening capital markets to new companies; however, the
risk of exposure involved with new technologies is causing collateral
participants to either refuse to offer their services or to raise the prices of those
services to such an extent that they effectively become unavailable. 92 For
example, plaintiffs who notice a significant stock price decline or earnings
decline will file a securities claim naming accounting firms as defendants,
regardless of any factual evidence of fault.93 Such suits are a perversion of the
securities laws, which are designed to deter wrongdoing and to compensate
victims, not to provide insurance against stock price declines or poor
investment decisions.94 In determining the price of their services, accounting
firms will simply add the cost of settling these types of cases. Again, the Central
Bank Court recognized these "ripple effects" caused by the uncertainty and
excessiveness of lOb-5 litigation and stated that "newer and smaller companies
may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals ... [fearing that] ... a
newer or smaller company may not survive and that business failure would
generate securities litigation against the professional, among others."95 The
effect of providing disincentives to naming collateral participants when there
has been no fraud and proportionately limiting liability to more accurately
reflect guilt is to keep valuable markets open to new industries which provide
many benefits to the economy through entrepreneurial risk.96
C. Effect on Corporate Directors' and Officers' Liability
Related to the problems which joint and several liability pose to capital
formation is the impact of possibly disproportionate liability upon
management. The introduction of proportionate liability into 10b-5 litigation
will have a significant impact on the problems of corporations in attracting
experienced outside directors to serve on their boards. In his floor statement
on August 12, 1992, Senator Terry Sanford described the problem:
Often, more experienced, successful business managers are unwilling
to put their life savings and reputations at risk. For those companies
trying to retain and insure the best directors ... their situations have
been exacerbated by... costs which merely reflect the risk insurance
92 Fischel, supra note 10, at 1053.
93Id. at 1052.
941d. at 1053.
95114 S. Ct. at 1454.
96 See Cox, supra note 45.
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companies face in guarding directors from suit. In the long run this
will hurt American businesses who are finding it more difficult to
attract the most qualified people to serve on their boards.97
Under current rules of joint and several liability, plaintiffs may individually
name outside directors and officers as defendants individually, even when
other defendants (especially officers and inside directors) are appreciably more
culpable for the alleged misrepresentations and fully able to respond in
damages.98 Such joinder is extremely beneficial to plaintiffs even in light of the
extreme difficulty of attempting to prove personal knowledge of the facts that
should have put the defendant directors and officers on notice.99 The benefit
to plaintiffs is two-fold. First, by suing directors and officers individually,
proceeds from directors' and officers' insurance policies become potentially
available to plaintiffs.100 Second, directors and officers can be counted on to be
powerful advocates for settlement. These individuals are more risk conscious
than many of the entity defendants due to the threat of personal liability, and
during the settlement process many individually named directors and officers
are still serving on the boards of the entity defendants. Therefore, a personal
disposition to settle may influence decisions concerning the entity's position
in the litigation. 101
For a number of reasons, the likelihood of adjudication on the merits of a
case is even more remote when directors and officers are named as 10b-5
defendants. First, directors and officers are extremely risk adverse and
pro-settlement because they face liability that is greatly disproportionate to the
benefits received from the corporation. In 1989, the average annual salary for
outside directors was $23,000 to $50,000, while claimed damages for 10b-5
violations soared into the millions. 102 Therefore, a judgment against an outside
director could not be satisfied from his compensation from the corporation and
97138 CONG. REC. 12,604 (1992).
98 See, e.g., In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680 F. Supp. 1360, 1362-63 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
The claimed damages in the suit were $48.75 million. Id. The defendants included the
issuer of the stock, which had netted almost $90 million in cash from its $100 million
initial public offering less than four months before the suit was filed, and a class of 124
underwriters that included Shearson Lehman Bros., Smith, Barney, Harris Upham &
Co., and Dean Witter Reynolds. Id. Plainly, the entity defendants were able to respond
fully in damages. Nevertheless, the complaint also named ten individuals: four officers,
one of whom was also a director, and six outside directors. Id.
99 See Alexander, supra note 8 (The reason that the knowledge requirement is difficult
to prove when dealing with officers and directors is that knowledge of companies'
employees can be attributed to the employer but not its directors and officers).
10OSee, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (where corporation and
directors agreed to pay $23.5 million in a settlement, $10 million was paid by director
and officer insurance and, fortunately for the directors and officers, the balance was paid
by a successful bidder for the corporation).
101 See Alexander, supra note 8.
102See KORN/FERRY INT'L, BOARD OF DIRECToRS 14TH ANNUAL STUDY 12 (1987).
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potentially could consume personal assets derived from other activities and
personal wealth. Settlements, in contrast, rarely, if ever, involve significant
contributions from individual directors, because settlement agreements
normally provide that individual defendants will "cause to be made" certain
payments to the settlement fund funded by insurance.103
Second, the insurance industry itself also provides a large disincentive to
individual defendants to take a case to trial. During the mid-1980's, just as the
demand for director and officer insurance was peaking, some insurance
companies became wise to the risk of huge liability from directors and officers
and the likelihood of settlement. In response to the ruling in Smith v. Van
Gorkom,104 they simply stopped offering liability insurance covering Rule 10b-5
claims.105 Although this ban on director and officer insurance has since been
lifted, remnants of the fear of excessive liability have remained in the form of
extremely high premiums and the existence of "exclusion" clauses in insurance
contracts. 106
The extremely high cost of director and officer insurance is a direct result of
the pro-settlement system which has developed. 107 Premiums incorporate the
non-merit based claims experience of insurance companies.l 08 Insurers realize
that they will be forced to fund settlements more often due to individual
defendants' risk aversion and uncertainty over the merits. As a result, insurers
simply raise rates and place new enterprises in a "Catch-22 situation"-the need
for experienced guidance frustrated by the lack of resources to gain directors'
and officers' insurance to entice that guidance.109 In addition, realizing that
plaintiffs are equally unsure of the merits of a lawsuit and trial averse,
insurance companies will provide insurance at exorbitant costs to defendants
and merely negotiate a settlement with plaintiffs for an amount substantially
103 See Alexander, supra note 8.
104488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (the court abrogated the effectiveness of the presumption
of the business judgment rule, which was a common law doctrine of non-liability for
corporate judgments of officers and directors); see generally Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of
Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business
Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983); Daniel Hertzberg, Insurers Beginning to Refuse
Coverage on Directors, Officers in Takeover Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20,1986, at 3.
105 See David B. Hilder, Risky Business: Liability Insurance is Dicult to Find Now for
Directors, Officers, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1985, at 1.
106 See Karen Slater, Firms May Find Insuring Boards is Getting Easier, WALL ST. J., Jan.
13, 1987, at I (noting that director and officer insurance, while more available is also
more costly; most companies pay $40,000 to $50,000 per $1 million in coverage).
1071d. (insurance rates reflect the frequency of settlement claims of policy holders).
108 See Alexander, supra note 8.
109 See generally Michael Brakely & Cindy Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1989) (insurance costs will rise as
the courts find a broader duty of care for directors, as a result, costs of insurance rose
from $1,358 per million dollars in coverage in 1984 to $23,386 in 1988).
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below the amount of the insurance coverage.110 Therefore, if the current
settlement practices remain unchanged, some commentators have predicted
that the insurance industry can expect to make a substantial profit at the
expense of innocent or only partially-culpable defendants.
The insurance industry has also contributed to the pro-settlement movement
in 10b-5 litigation through the introduction of exclusion clauses in insurance
contracts. 111 Under these clauses, if an individual defendant is found guilty of
a securities violation, which means such defendant has acted with a culpable
state of mind greater than negligence, the policy becomes ineffective. The
policies are designed to ensure against mistakes (negligence), not
consciously-wrongful acts. These clauses provide an extremely strong
incentive for individual defendants to settle, for if there is a settlement, there
is no finding of any culpable mental state, and the policy coverage continues.
Many states have addressed the problems similar to the ones just outlined
by introducing into their corporate laws a "cap" on the amount of damages that
courts may impose on directors in cases other than those involving intentional
or willful misconduct.112 Commentators have attributed the success of this
"cap" approach to the fact that it subjects directors and officers to less risk of
catastrophic financial loss while retaining some exposure to liability.
The latter acts as an incentive for directors to use care, retaining the
protection for shareholders by deterring culpable conduct.113 This approach
also has been praised because it provides stability to the volatile directors' and
officers' insurance market by eliminating fears of enormous damage awards
and reducing costs.114
Similarly, the Bill seeks to limit liability of directors, officers, and other actors
to be proportional with each actor's degree of culpability. Although
proportional liability does not remove the difficulty of determining whether a
defendant will be held substantively liable, it does remove the incentive to
disregard the merits of the case in settlement negotiations. 115 If an outside
director knows that he may only be held liable for an amount of damages
proportional to the level of his culpability as determined by a jury and that
plaintiffs will have a difficult time establishing that there was actual knowledge
of the facts giving rise to the lawsuit, an individual defendant's risk aversion
may be reduced, and he may be more willing to go to trial or to settle for an
110 See generally Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 73.
11 1See Slater, supra note 106, at 1; Thomas J. Neff, Liability Panic in the Board Room,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 22.
112 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(A)(10) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 402(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1690 (Michie 1989); see generally R. Link
Newcomb, The Limitation of Director's Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 411 (1991); Alexander, supra note 8, at 118 n.373.
113 See Newcomb, supra note 112.
1141d.
115 See supra text accompanying note 86.
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appropriately lower amount. In addition, by imposing proportional liability,
the imbalance between economic gain from working on a board and the degree
of possible exposure is reduced, encouraging more outsiders to agree to sit on
boards.
Furthermore, there would be reduced justification for continuing to include
non-merit based settlement risks in insurance premiums, thus reducing rates.
By reducing rates, insurance becomes more readily available, and
entrepreneurial enterprises will then have the ability to offer insurance
protection and attract experienced board members.
D. Effect on Initial Decision to Bring Frivolous 1 Ob-5 Actions
By relieving the pressure to settle unmeritorious suits caused by joint and
several liability, proportionate liability, in theory, will prevent unmeritorious
lawsuits from being brought. The premise for this argument is that plaintiffs'
attorneys who are less likely to recover their costs and fees due to the prospects
of trial will be forced to investigate the merits of their cases in order to
determine whether the cases will bring favorable trial outcomes. If plaintiffs
recognize that the expected value of going to trial is negative, either because
the chances of winning are small (the case is frivolous) or the expected value
of the judgment is small relative to the expected value of litigation costs, the
plaintiff should not bring the case.116 However, under the present system this
negative expected value of litigation does not deter plaintiffs who are hoping
to merely extract a settlement and who do not intend to go to trial.117
The most important incentives for plaintiffs and their attorneys in bringing
a cause of action are compensation and fees. The fee award system in securities
class actions provides plaintiffs' attorneys strong incentives to resolve cases by
settlement rather than trial. If the attorneys obtain a recovery for the class, either
by judgment or by settlement, they receive their fees and expenses out of the
recovery.118 If plaintiffs' attorneys lose the class claims at trial, the time spent
on the case is not compensated, and the out-of-pocket expenses will have to be
absorbed. 119 Considering the high costs of securities actions,120 an assured
recovery from settlement seems preferable. The added risk, created by the
introduction of proportionate liability, of actually having to take a case to trial
(because the defendant more likely will refuse to settle) and the risk of having
116See generally Bebchuk, supra note 73.
ll 71d.
ll 8See Alexander, supra note 8.
1191d.
120 See, e.g., Carole Kahn, The Big-Stakes Battleground of Shareholder Suits, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 10, 1988, at 13, col. 1; Paul D. Freeman, The World of Shareholder Litigation According
to Bill Lerach, CAL. LAW, Apr. 1989, at 83 (quoting William S. Lerach, a partner in the
prominent securities plaintiff's firm of Milberg, Weiss, "[W]e've had some catastrophic
failures costing hundreds of thousands in costs and millions in uncollected attorney's
fees.").
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to absorb lost income and costs in the event of an adverse verdict should curtail
the bringing of lawsuits only for their settlement value.121
E. Does the Doctrine of Contribution Provide an Answer?
The equitable doctrine of contribution allows defendants to require other
tortfeasors, even those not named by the plaintiff, to bear their fair portion of
the plaintiff's damages.122 Historically, contribution was not available in the
intentional tort context where 10b-5 has its origins.123 In addition, there is no
express provision for contribution included in section 10(b), but the United
States Supreme Court has held that a right to contribution exists in 10b-5.124
Prior to Musick, the rationale of courts finding such a right had been that
contribution under a 10b-5 action was consistent with the specific liability
provisions of the 1934 Act which expressly provides for a right of contribution
in areas other than section 10(b).125 One court has said that this trend is
motivated primarily by the policy objective of fairness to defendants. 126 In
calculating the amount of damages to be paid by each defendant, whether
named or impleaded, the courts originally used a pro rata methodology, which
is to simply divide the total amount of damages awarded by the number of
defendants found liable. 127 For example, in Globus, Inc. v. Law Research
12 1 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 527 (an increased risk of losing fees may discourage
representation of unwarranted claims).
12 2 See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50
(5th ed. 1984); see also Granada Invs., Inc. vs. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203,1205 (6th Cir.
1992); Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324,1328 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
12 3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(3) (1977) (The intentional tort analogy
is appropriate in lob-5 actions as evidenced by the Supreme Court's requirement that
a defendant act intentionally in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).).
124 Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
12 5See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987); Huddleston v.
Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 534, 557 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727 (2d
Cir. 1981); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1979); deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Col. 1968), modfied on other grounds, 435 F.2d
1223 (10th Cir. 1970);seealso Annotation, Right to Contribution Among Defendants in Action
Under 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 915 USCA 78j(b) or SEC Rule 10(b)-5, 62
A.L.R. FED. 802-19 (1983) (analyzing cases finding contribution in 10b-5 actions).
126 See Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1328:
[This] trend ... has been motivated primarily by two policy objectives:
fairness to defendants and deterrence. First, and probably most
importantly contribution achieves a more fair and equal distribution of
justice by spreading plaintiffs' losses proportionately among all wrong-
doers... Otherwise, under the traditional common law rule, plaintiffs
could unilaterally force one of many wrongdoers to bear the entire loss,
even though others may be equally or more to blame.
127 See generally Patricia B. Hogan, All Things Being Unequal: Use of the Doctrine of
Relative Culpability in Apportioning Contribution, 57 U. CN. L. REV. 769 (1988).
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Services,128 the court held that the appropriate method of contribution should
be on a pro rata basis in a 10b-5 action. In Globus, three defendants had prepared
a misleading offering circular and were found to be jointly and severally liable.
One defendant, the underwriter of the stock, paid the full amount of the
judgment. In a second court proceeding, the underwriter persuaded the court
that it was entitled to contribution from both the issuing company and the
issuer's president. The court proceeded to divide the judgment into three equal
portions, one for each of the three culpable parties.
Under the pro rata measure of contribution, defendants have no increased
incentive to take cases to trial because the extent of liability has no relation to
the degree of their culpability; instead, a defendant's liability is determined
simply by dividing by the number of guilty parties. This retains settlement as
the preferable method of dispute resolution. Accordingly, some courts have
held that a contribution methodology based on the pro rata system is not
mandated by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, and a balance of the relative
fault of the defendants is appropriate in some situations.129 In Pepsi Co., Inc. v.
Continental Casualty Co.,130 the court recognized the wisdom of the relative fault
methodology and held that a defendant insurance company, which paid the
full amount of a director's and officer's liability policy, was entitled to
contribution from two other defendants "[b]ased upon the notion of relative of
fault."13 1
In effect, the circumstances sought by the proposed legislation, from a
defendant's perspective, could be largely achieved simply by impleading other
culpable defendants and bringing a cross-claim based upon the theory of
contribution. Under a relative fault system, marginally culpable defendants
would reduce their degree of exposure to more accurately represent their
proportionate share of liability. However, as stated, normally the most culpable
defendants do not have assets to contribute.132 As a result, even if contribution
was available on a relative fault basis, marginally culpable defendants still
could pay a disproportionate share of the damages.
V. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated, the onus of joint and several liability consists of the risk
of being held disproportionately liable in comparison with the degree of one's
culpability. This imbalance creates substantial incentives for defendants to
settle lawsuits regardless of the merits of the case and substantial incentives for
plaintiffs to name innocent or only marginally culpable defendants in order to
128318 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
129 See Hogan, supra note 127.
130640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
13 11d. at 669.
132 See supra text accompanying note 87.
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extract settlement amounts disproportionate to the degree of culpability. Also,
by holding marginally culpable defendants liable for the full amount of
damage awards causes a deterioration in the availability of capital markets to
those unable to pay the higher prices for services. The legislation, as a remedy,
seeks to diminish the disparity between an individual's culpability and his
share of the damages by introducing into 10b-5 litigation a system of
proportionate liability. In many circumstances this will mean a reduced
recovery for innocent investors.
The proposed legislation seems to strike the proper balance. The interests in
protecting innocent defendants from frivolous lawsuits and avoiding
disproportionate liability for marginally culpable defendants are balanced
with the interests in maintaining the original purpose of the securities acts, the
protection of investors, by retaining joint and several liability for knowing
violations of Rule 10b-5. The proposed legislation does not discourage
plaintiffs or their attorneys from bringing meritorious claims to court.
Defendants who violate securities laws should not reap economic gain from
wrongful acts and then go unpunished; however, innocent or marginally
culpable deep pocket defendants should not be forced to subsidize the legal
witch hunt that has developed under the guise of joint and several liability. The
Supreme Court in Central Bank has taken the first step by removing aiding and
abetting liability from 10b-5 litigation. The proposed legislation represents the
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